'I am not a racist' Andew Bolt and free speech more

‘I  am  not  a  racist,  but  …’:  Free  speech,  racial  vilification  and  the  Bolt  case   Associate  Professor  Martin  Hirst  &  Kathryn  Keeble   School  of  Communication  &  Creative  Arts,   Deakin  University   Academia.edu  version,  published  5  November  2011     In  2009  the  Herald  Sun  published  two  articles  penned  by  staff  columnist  Andrew  Bolt,  ‘It’s  so   hip  to  be  black’  and  ‘White  fellas  in  the  black’  (Bolt  2009a)  (Bolt  2009b).  In  the  first  article   published  on  April  15,  Bolt  listed  16  people  he  referred  to  as  ‘the  white  face  of  a  new  black   race—the  political  Aborigine,’  inferring  that  their  identification  as  Aboriginal  was  for   financial  gain  (Bolt  2009a).  In  August  2009,  the  Herald  Sun  published  Bolt’s  second  article  on   the  same  theme.  Bolt  listed  seven  people  he  accused  of  identifying  as  Aboriginal  for   financial  gain,  five  of  whom  he  had  identified  in  the  original  article.  Bolt  stated  that  those   individuals  ‘who,  out  of  their  multi-­‐stranded  but  largely  European  genealogy,’  instead   ‘decide  to  identify  with  the  thinnest  of  all  those  strands,’  do  so  in  order  to  secure  ‘special   encouragements  and  prizes  we  set  aside  for  Aborigines’  (Bolt  2009b).  Nine  of  the  people   named  in  the  articles,  activist  Pat  Eatock  ;  former  ATSIC  chairman  Geoff  Clark;  author  Anita   Heiss;  artist  Bindi  Cole;  health  worker  Leeanne  Enoch;  academics  Graham  Atkinson,  Wayne   Atkinson  and  Larissa  Behrendt;  and  lawyer/academic  Mark  McMillan,  issued  proceedings   against  Bolt  and  the  Herald  and  Weekly  Times  (HWT)  under  section  18C  of  the  Racial   Discrimination  Act  (1975).  Bolt  and  HWT  countered  with  the  claim  that  the  articles  were   written  in  good  faith,  the  content  was  in  the  public  interest  and  under  the  provisions  of  18D   of  the  Act,  were  fair  comment.  The  hearing  began  under  Justice  Mordecai  Bromberg  on   March  29,  2011.  On  September  28,  2011,  Justice  Bromberg  ruled  in  favour  of  Pat  Eatock  and   the  others  named  by  Bolt  and  ordered  the  Herald  Sun  to  print  a  court-­‐worded  apology.  Bolt   and  HWT  chose  not  to  appeal  the  decision  despite  an  avalanche  of  calls  to  do  so  from   politicians  and  commentators  linking  the  outcome  in  the  case  to  an  attack  on  free  speech.   On  October  5,  2011,  the  Institute  of  Public  Affairs  ran  a  full-­‐page  advertisement  in  The   Australian,  featuring  650  names  presumably  in  agreement  with  their  sentiments,  declaring   freedom  of  speech  to  be  under  threat  in  Australia  following  the  result  of  the  Bolt  case,  and   stating:  ‘It  is  alarming  that  in  2011  someone  can  be  taken  to  court  for  expressing  an  opinion’   (2009b).  The  constant  reiteration  by  Bolt  and  other  commentators  aided  and  abetted  by   conservative  politicians  such  as  George  Brandis  and  Tony  Abbott,  that  Justice  Bromberg’s   ruling  was  an  attack  on  free  speech  obscures  the  outcome  that  Bolt’s  original  comments   were  found  to  be  racist  according  to  the  Racial  Discrimination  Act.  Further,  in  calling  for  the   repeal  of  section  18C  of  the  Act  due  to  its  curtailing  of  a  perceived  freedom  of  speech,   despite  Justice  Bromberg’s  ruling  that  Bolt’s  two  articles  were  found  not  to  be  fair  or   accurate  reports  or  fair  comment,  the  implication  is  that  racist  attacks  on  minority  groups   are  acceptable  whereas  attacks  on  freedom  of  speech  are  not.   The  Herald  Sun’s  September  29  editorial  defending  Andrew  Bolt  against  Federal  Court  ruling   argues  that  the  offending  columns  were  justified.  In  the  second  paragraph  the  editorial   ‘maintains’  the  view  that:   1     What  Bolt  wrote  in  this  newspaper  and  online  was  not  based  on  race,  but  on  the  way   those  who  took  such  offence  used  race  ('Free  Speech  is  vital  to  society'    2011).   This  is  a  semantic  point  that  twists  the  argument  to  suggest  that  the  actions  of  those  who   claimed  to  be  offended,  insulted,  intimidated  and  humiliated  by  Bolt’s  comments  are   themselves  racist.  In  the  fifth  par  the  editorial  insists  the  paper  was  right  to  publish  Bolt’s   comments:   We  say  [publication]  was  [justifiable]  and  if  it  is  the  interpretation  of  the  law  that   comes  into  question,  then  it  is  the  law  that  should  be  changed  ('Free  Speech  is  vital   to  society'    2011).   This  is  a  key  turning  point  in  the  argument,  which  sets  up  the  HWT  defence  that  the   unfettered  principle  of  free  speech  must  trump  a  law,  which  attempts  to  curtail  it.  The   Australian’s  legal  editor  Chris  Merritt  made  the  same  point  reminding  us  that  if  his  News   Limited  bosses  lose  their  legal  challenge,  ‘the  onus  will  fall  to  the  government  –  or  its   replacement—to  rebalance  this  biased  law’  (Merritt  2011).  The  bold  statement  here  is  that   the  law  is  wrong—not  the  actions  of  Andrew  Bolt.     What  is  free  speech  in  the  Bolt  context?   The  following  paragraph  from  the  Herald  Sun’s  editorial  of  29  September  defending  Andrew   Bolt  attempts  to  define  free  speech  in  this  context:   A  key  measure  of  a  mature  society  is  the  ability  to  publicly  discuss  unpopular  views   without  fear,  no  matter  how  distasteful  they  are  to  some  of  us,  and  to  follow  this   discussion  with  vigorous  public  debate  ('Free  Speech  is  vital  to  society'    2011).   But  this  case  was  not  about  tasteful  or  distasteful  comments.  It  was  about  the  deliberate   denigration  and  traducing  of  nine  individuals  based  only  on  their  ethnic  identity.    The  Herald   and  Weekly  Times  justification  on  this  point  seems  to  imply  that  anything  goes  in  the   freedom  of  speech  stakes.  Writing  in  the  Herald  Sun  the  day  after  the  Federal  Court   decision,  senior  Murdoch  reporter  Paul  Toohey  wrote  an  op-­‐ed  piece  attacking  the  recently   announced  government  media  inquiry.  The  same  free  speech  argument  was  raised  in  the   context  of  possible  legislative  and  regulatory  outcomes  imposed  by  government.  The   Murdoch  press  in  Australia  is  positioning  the  inquiry  as  a  threat  to  freedom  of  speech,   despite  no  evidence  to  suggest  this  is  the  government’s  intention.  Toohey  cites  the   American  situation  against  a  background  of  what  he  says  is  international  concern  that  the   government  might  intervene  to  curtail  press  freedom:   [W]hile  American  press  freedom  is  not  absolute,  any  legislative  media  restrictions   cannot  override  the  underlying  rights  to  freedom  of  expression  (Toohey  2011).   This  argument  takes  no  account  of  the  public  benefit  and  public  interest  in  having  a  legal   means  to  curtail  hateful,  hurtful  and  inflammatory  propaganda,  as  occurred  in  the  Bolt  case.   Any  society  that  wants  to  call  itself  democratic  and  civilized  will  have  legislative  and  legal   provisions  preventing  racist  speech.  There  is  no  right  to  freedom  of  speech  that  involves   racial  or  other  defamation  based  on  stereotyping,  misconceptions,  or  deliberately  deceptive   arguments.  There  is  no  right  to  free  speech  if  the  aim  of  that  speech  is  to  encourage  others   2     to  action—even  if  that  action  (at  this  point)  is  merely  an  invitation  to  share  such  views.  On   this  point  the  Herald  Sun  editorial  spins  itself  a  very  tight  web,  but  unfortunately  it  appears   caught  in  the  clever  strands  of  its  own  faulty  logic:   This  has  very  much  been  a  trial  of  freedom  of  speech  [sic].  Those  who  complained   had  the  opportunity  to  put  forward  their  own  views.  They  were  offered  equal  space   on  these  pages,  but  sought  to  silence  Bolt  on  the  subject  of  the  social  consequences   of  their  choice  to  identify  as  Aboriginal  ('Free  Speech  is  vital  to  society'    2011).   We  cannot,  at  this  point,  offer  an  opinion  on  whether  or  not  the  complainants  were  offered   and  refused  a  chance  to  respond  in  the  paper.  However,  we  observe  that  this  would  not   necessarily  have  been  in  the  plaintiff’s  best  interests.  The  only  possible  outcome  would  be   to  add  fuel  to  the  fire  Bolt  was  attempting  to  ignite  with  an  explosion  of  feigned  moral   outrage.  If  we  had  been  advising  the  nine  our  recommendation  would  have  been  not  to   engage  with  Bolt  in  the  pages  of  his  own  newspaper.  Bolt  has  previous  form  in  these   matters  and  he  would  know  that  anything  the  accused  put  forward  in  their  defence  would   be  used  to  further  inflame  the  mob  rule  atmosphere  that  demagogues  thrive  in.  But  on  the   last  line,  ‘the  social  consequences  of  their  choice  to  identify  as  Aboriginal,’  we  can  surmise   that  the  irony  of  this  comment  is  lost  on  the  editorialist  ('Free  Speech  is  vital  to  society'     2011).  One  of  the  social  consequences  the  plaintiffs  had  to  endure  was  the  vilification  and   opprobrium  heaped  on  them  by  Andrew  Bolt  in  his  offending  columns  and  by  his  legion  of   ill-­‐informed  fans  who  lap  up  his  diatribes.   Linking  the  ‘Bolt  principle’  to  ‘illiberal’  attacks  on  the  free  speech   That  Paul  Toohey’s  29  September  Herald  Sun  column  arguing  against  the  government’s   media  inquiry  appeared  on  the  same  page  as  the  pro-­‐Bolt  editorial  and  a  long  piece  by  Bolt   himself,  is  no  coincidence.     On  29  September,  The  Australian’s  legal  editor  Chris  Merritt  wrote  a  comment  piece,  ‘A   biased  principle  threatens  the  nation’,  criticising  the  Federal  Court  decision  in  the  Bolt  case   (Merritt  2011).  He  even  names  it  ‘The  court’s  “Bolt  principle”’  and  argues  it  will  turn   Australia  into  ‘a  nation  of  tribes…protected  species  too  fragile  to  cope  with  robust  public   discourse’  (Merritt  2011).  Merritt  labels  Judge  Bromberg’s  decision  ‘patronising’  toward   Aboriginal  people  and  warns  it  will  ‘divide  the  nation’  (Merritt  2011).  The  flaw  in  the  ruling  is   that  the  judge—in  Merritt’s  view—operated  as  ‘a  kind  of  uber-­‐editor’  who  took  it  upon   himself  to  rule  out  words  ‘he  did  not  like,’  in  effect,  trying  to  tell  Andrew  Bolt  how  to  write   his  column  (Merritt  2011).  He  concludes:  ‘It  was  almost  funny’  (Merritt  2011).  Merritt’s   punchline  is  hard  to  miss:  ‘how  easily  the  Racial  Discrimination  Act  can  silence  unpopular   opinion’  (Merritt  2011).  Merritt  suggests,  without  any  evidence,  that  this  new  power  will   ‘have  a  pernicious  effect’  on  public  debate  ‘on  the  issue  of  race’  (Merritt  2011).  Fortunately,   we  are  given  a  fearful  example  of  how  this  ‘pernicious  effect’  might  operate  on  Australian   the  psyche:   It  will  encourage  people  to  see  themselves  not  as  Australians  but  as  separate  racial   groups.  By  thinking  in  such  racist  terms,  they  will  have  the  advantage  of  a  law  that  is   ridiculously  skewed  in  their  favour  (Merritt  2011).   3     There’s  a  lot  wrong  with  this  statement;  a  key  issue  is  the  essentialised  idea  of  ‘race’  at  the   core.  Other  Murdoch  commentators  have  made  similar  arguments  that  touch  on  the  issue   of  separatism  in  multicultural  society.  In  this  instance  Merritt  appears  to  be  suggesting  that   the  Federal  Court  decision  will  somehow  make  it  easier  for  groups  arguing  for  a  racially   separatist  approach  in  Australia  to  stop  opponents  from  criticising  them:   Such  people,  if  indeed  they  exist,  will  then  be  able  to  use  the  ‘Bolt  principle’  to   silence  their  critics  ‘using  a  procedure  [Bromberg’s  ruling]  that  is  almost  guaranteed   to  favour  racial  groups  claiming  to  be  offended’  (Merritt  2011).   The  language  in  these  passages  from  Merritt  is  vague,  but  on  closer  reading  the  words   reveal  a  subtle  coding.  Judge  Bromberg  erred  by  not  using  ‘community  standards’  as  the   ‘critical  threshold  test’.  His  favoured  method,  to  question  Bolt’s  statements  ‘from  the   perspective  of  a  hypothetical  representative  of  those  claiming  to  be  offended’,  is  wrong  in   Merritt’s  opinion  (Merritt  2011).  But  how  does  this  reconcile  with  Bolt’s  comments  being   ‘unpopular  opinion’  as  suggested  in  several  Murdoch  paper  editorials  and  by  Merritt   himself?  If  Merritt  believes  Bolt’s  columns  would  not  have  offended  ‘community  standards’   they  must,  almost  by  definition,  be  at  least  somewhat  popular.  By  acknowledging  they  are   ‘unpopular’  the  Murdoch  stable  of  writers  is  establishing  that  popular  taste  is  not  dictated   by  ordinary  Australians  but  by  an  elite  that  includes  the  ‘political’  and  ‘professional’   Aborigines,  some  members  of  the  judiciary  and  their  supporters  in  the  chattering  classes   and  liberal  commentariat.  This  appeal  to  populism  is  common  among  conservative   commentators  worldwide.  It  is  a  theme  taken  up  with  some  gusto  by  News  Limited   columnist  and  blogger  Miranda  Devine:   The  Federal  Court  has  shown  us  that  the  Racial  Discrimination  Act  can  be  used  to   silence  unfashionable  opinion  (Devine  2011).   What  Justice  Bromberg  found  in  the  case  against  Bolt  was  not  just  unfashionable  opinion   but  two  ‘inflammatory  and  provocative’  articles  where  ‘the  use  of  mockery  and  derision  was   extensive’  (Bromberg  2011).  Bromberg  stated  that:   There  is  no  doubt  that  the  newspaper  articles  were  designed  to  sting  the  people  in   the  “trend”  and  in  particular  those  identified  therein.  The  language  was  not  simply   colourful  …  It  was  language  …  intended  to  confront  those  that  he  accused  with  “the   consequences  of  their  actions”  and  done  with  the  expectation  that  they  would  be   both  “offended”  and  “upset”  and  in  the  hope  that  they  would  be  “remorseful”  (the   words  quoted  are  Mr  Bolt’s)  (Bromberg  2011).   But,  as  Devine  warns,  ‘make  no  mistake’  there  is  a  conspiracy  under  way  to  silence  those   who  dare  to  speak  out  against  political  correctness:   [T]he  swarm  of  Left-­‐wing  lawyers  who  have  urged  it  on,  acting  pro  bono  or   commenting  approvingly  from  the  sidelines,  are  all  part  of  an  illiberal  movement  in   Australia  to  crush  dissent  (Devine  2011).   There  is  no  evidence  for  this  claim,  nor  for  the  ludicrous  idea  that  Andrew  Bolt  is  somehow  a   dissenter;  but  it  is  a  consistent  thread  in  the  Murdoch  press  oeuvre  on  this  issue.  What’s   missing  from  this  one-­‐sided  fusillade  of  misdirected  potshots  and  crazed  sniper  fire  is  any   4     attempt  to  address  issues  of  power.  Bolt,  Devine,  Merritt  and  the  other  hacks  in  the   Murdoch  stable  have  almost  unlimited  resources  to  traduce  their  straw  man  enemies  as   confirmed  by  News  Limited  CEO,  John  Hartigan:   [W]e  have  around  140  newspapers  in  Australia.  That  includes  one  national   broadsheet,  15  daily  and  Sunday  metropolitan  newspapers,  107  community  titles  &   21  regional  newspapers.  We’ve  also  got  27  magazines  in  our  stable,  from  Vogue  to   Golfing  Digest.  We  run  over  100  websites  and  now  have  iPad  applications  for  five   mastheads.  7  in  every  10  Australians  read  a  News  Limited  newspaper  or  visit  one  of   our  websites  every  week.  Our  national  and  metro  mastheads  are  read  by  over  8.6   million  Australians  each  week  …  I’m  giving  you  these  figures  not  to  boast  but   because  understanding  our  reach  is  key  (Hartigan  2011).   Bolt,  in  particular,  has  extraordinary  reach,  writing  two  columns  per  week  for  the  Herald  Sun   which  are  then  syndicated  via  News  Limited  newspapers  throughout  Australia,  writing  his   own  Bolt  Blog  posted  seven  days  per  week  on  the  Herald  Sun  website,  hosting  his  own   Sunday  morning  television  commentary  program,  the  Bolt  Report,  as  well  as  a  regular   morning  spot  on  a  Melbourne  talkback  radio  program.  There  can  be  no  doubt  Andrew  Bolt   is  an  influential  asset  supporting  Murdoch’s  political  reach  into  Australian  society.   Mainstreaming  Racism   Paul  Kelly  writing  in  The  Australian  blamed  the  federal  government  for  being  out  of  touch   with  ‘mainstream  values’  and  for  refusing  to  ‘condemn  the  stifling  of  debate’  (Kelly  2011).     Indeed,  it  is  hard  to  find  a  more  perfect  example  of  the  trap  of  political  correctness   and  the  legal-­‐human  rights  culture  of  legislating  for  good  behaviour  than  this   application  of  the  Racial  Discrimination  Act  …  when  will  Labor  get  some  mainstream   common  sense  into  its  values?  (Kelly  2011).   James  Allan  reiterated  Kelly’s  call  for  an  endorsement  of  mainstream  values,  declaring  ‘that   most  Australians  are  on  the  side  of  more  free  speech,  at  least  outside  the  Green-­‐voting   inner-­‐city  suburbs’  (Allan  2011).     Enforced  hate-­‐speech  laws.  Ridiculous  talk  of  new  privacy  laws  …  and  that  Green   party-­‐driven  media  inquiry  …  we  are  not  heading  in  the  right  direction  on  free   speech  in  this  country.  And  it’s  up  to  us  to  make  our  dislike  of  the  malevolent   direction  plain  (Allan  2011).   Journalists  often  claim  a  denial  of  any  underlying  intent  and  trivialise  any  effect  of  racist   writing  on  recipients.  In  a  piece  in  The  Australian  four  days  after  Justice  Bromberg’s  ruling,   Bolt  not  only  disputed  the  ruling  but  reversed  it  by  stating:  ‘I  am  not  a  racist,  my  message   was  anti-­‐racist  and  my  message  has  always  been  consistent’  (Allan  2011).  Fellow  News   Limited  columnist  Brendan  O’Neill,  while  lamenting  the  creation  of  a  new  paradigm  of   ‘censure  and  censorship,’  provided  an  example  of  the  trivialisation  of  the  effect  of  Bolt’s   columns  on  their  subjects:     The  terrifying  thing  that  this  ruling  codifies  is  the  idea  that  people’s  feelings  are  more   important  than  free  speech…  In  short,  the  case  confirms  the  modern-­‐day   5     sanctification  of  the  Offended  Minority,  whose  personal  and  emotional  interests   must  override  the  rights  of  the  rest  of  us’  (O'Neill  2011).   A  similar  line  was  taken  in  a  piece  in  The  Weekend  Australian.  ‘They,’  meaning  other  than   the  stereotypical  ‘noble  savage’  in  need  of  protection:   …  push  the  abstract  rights  agenda  of  educated,  urban  Aborigines  over  the  housing   and  education  needs  of  indigenous  Australians  in  remote  and  regional  communities   …  most  Australians  …  are  sympathetic  to  indigenous  disadvantage  but  troubled  by   affirmative  action  for  educated,  urban  Aborigines  ('Wisdom  resides  in  the  votes  of  all   people'    2011).   The  repeated  accusation  of  priviledge  for    ‘urban  Aborigines,’  reflects  an  accepted  division   of  indigenous  ‘place’  in  Australia,  and  reveals  the  supposed  transgression  of  this  group.  As   Jon  Stratton  states:     ”Australian”  settlement  has  traditionally  located  itself  in  a  factual  history  of  white   settlement  occurring  from  the  south-­‐east  of  the  continent.  The  north  of  the   continent  has  been  constructed  as  the  site  of  the  Other,  of  that  which  has  been   repressed  in  the  south’s  production  of  the  real  (Stratton  1989).   Critical  discourse  analyst,  Teun  van  Dijk,  has  been  mapping  the  discursive  reproduction  of   racism  in  the  media  in  an  ongoing  project  from  the  early  1980s.  ‘Elites,’  van  Dijk  states,  of   which  the  media  is  one  body,  ‘initiate,  monitor,  and  control  the  majority  and  most   influential  forms  of  institutional  and  public  text  and  talk  …  may  set  or  change  the  agenda  of   public  discourse  and  opinion  making’  (Van  Dijk  1995:  4).  Cultural  theorist  Stuart  Hall   believes  the  media  ‘classify  …  the  world  in  terms  of  race’  by  constructing    ‘a  definition  of   what  race  is,  what  meaning  the  imagery  of  race  carries,  and  what  the  “problem  of  race”  is   understood  to  be’  (Hall  1981:  37).  In  addition,  the  media  ‘are  not  only  a  powerful  source  of   ideas  about  race.  They  are  also  one  place  where  these  ideas  are  articulated,  worked  on,   transformed  and  elaborated’  (Hall  1981:  37).   In  the  reproduction  of  racism  in  the  media,  where  social  norms  generally  prohibit  explicit   discrimination,  elite  discourse  ‘expresses,  persuasively  conveys  and  legitimates  ethnic  or   racial  stereotypes  and  prejudices  among  white  group  members,  and  may  thus  form  or   confirm  the  social  cognitions  of  other  whites’  (Van  Dijk  1993:  179).  Van  Dijk  identifies   strategies  of  defence  and  positive  self-­‐presentation  that  are  used  against  allegations  of   outright  racism.  Journalists  may  deny  that  they  made  incriminating  statements  or  that  there   was  any  ‘underlying  intentions,  purposes,  or  attitudes’  by  stating  “I  did  not  do/say  that”,  “I   did  not  do/say  that  on  purpose”,  “That  is  not  what  I  meant”,  “You  got  me  wrong”  (Van  Dijk   1993:  180).    In  addition,  accusations  about  biased  news  reports  about  minorities  are   dismissed  by  denying  any  responsibility  for  prejudicial  attitudes  these  reports  may  generate   in  their  audience  through  a  claim  to  truth:  ‘Telling  the  truth’  may  thus  be  the  typical   euphemism  of  those  accused  of  saying  or  writing  derogatory  things  about  minorities’  (Van   Dijk  1993:  180).   The  consensus  seems  to  be,  for  most  journalists,  that  any  form  of  media  censorship,  by  way   of  legal  constraints  such  as  the  Racial  Discrimination  Act,  ‘must  be  broken  in  order  to  tell  the   “truth”  [even  though]  to  “state  the  truth”,  meaning  “to  say  negative  things  about   6     minorities”,  may  well  be  against  the  prevalent  norms  of  tolerance  and  understanding’  (Van   Dijk  1993:  183-­‐4).  This  denial  of  racism  through  asserting  that  the  writer  is  only  conveying   the  truth  as  he  or  she  sees  it  and  must  be  able  to  convey  their  version  of  the  truth  to  the   public:     …  presupposes  that  the  journalist  or  columnist  believes  that  his  or  her  own  group  or   country  is  essentially  ‘tolerant’  towards  minorities  or  immigrants.  Positive  self-­‐ presentation  …  in  journalistic  discourse  …  should  be  seen  as  the  argumentative   denial  of  the  accusations  of  anti-­‐racists  (Van  Dijk  1993:  183).   As  Marcia  Langton  in  the  Sunday  Age  noted  ‘the  presumption  is  that  “white  people”  …  are   not  members  of  a  race  but  normal’  (Langton  2011).     Journalists  denials  and  disclaimers  are  often  ‘intended  as  an  exculpatory  device  …  rather   than  a  genuine  attempt  to  counter  …  contrary  messages’  as  was  pointed  out  by  Justice   Bromberg  highlighting  the  disingenuousness  of  a  disclaiming  paragraph  inserted  into  the   middle  of  Bolt’s  first  article  (Bromberg  2011).  Bolt  wrote:   I’m  not  saying  any  of  those  I’ve  named  chose  to  be  Aboriginal  for  anything  but  the   most  heartfelt  and  honest  of  reasons.  I  certainly  don’t  accuse  them  of  opportunism,   even  if  full-­‐blooded  Aborigines  may  wonder  how  such  fair  people  can  claim  to  be   one  of  them  and  in  some  cases  take  black  jobs  (Bolt  2009a).   Stella  Coram,  in  a  posting  on  the  internet  forum,  The  Conversation,  considers  that  Bolt’s   proviso  exposes  his  failure  in  understanding:     Bolt  reveals  his  cynicism  in  the  contentious  belief  that  people  who  are  essentially   white  choose  to  identify  as  Aboriginal  …  are  profiting  from  claiming  to  be  Aboriginal   …  At  the  same  time,  Bolt  fails  to  see  his  own  unearned  privilege  traditionally   associated  with  being  ‘white’  (Coram  on  Jakubowicz  2011).   Symbolic  Racism:  Who  gets  to  define  Aboriginality?   Justice  Bromberg,  in  ruling  against  Bolt,  found  that  each  of  the  nine  individuals  who  gave   evidence  in  the  Federal  Court  was  ‘entitled  to  regard  themselves  and  be  regarded  by  others   as  an  Aboriginal  person,’  and  went  on  to  state:   I  have  taken  into  account  the  possible  degree  of  harm  that  …  the  conduct  involved   may  have  caused  …  I  have  also  found  that  the  conduct  was  reasonably  likely  to  have   an  intimidatory  effect  on  …  fair-­‐skinned  Aboriginal  people  and  in  particular  young   Aboriginal  persons  or  others  with  vulnerability  in  relation  to  their  identity  …  and  …   the  articles  may  have  been  read  by  some  people  susceptible  to  racial  stereotyping   and  the  formation  of  racially  prejudicial  views  and  that  …  racially  prejudiced  views   have  been  reinforced,  encouraged  or  emboldened  (Bromberg  2011).   A  2003  government  briefing  paper,  ‘Defining  Aboriginality  in  Australia,’  recounts  an  episode   of  symbolic  racism  that  occurred  in  1988  at  the  RSL  national  conference.  Victorian  state   president  Bruce  Ruxton  called  for  an  amendment  to  ‘the  definition  of  Aborigine  to  eliminate   the  part-­‐whites  who  are  making  a  racket  out  of  being  so-­‐called  Aborigines  at  enormous  cost   to  the  taxpayers’  (Slee  1988).  National  president,  Brigadier  Alf  Garland  called  for  an   7     examination  to  verify  whether  an  Aboriginal  could  claim  to  be  ‘a  full-­‐blood  or  a  half-­‐caste  or   a  quarter-­‐caste  or  whatever’  in  determining  eligibility  for  government  assistance  (Slee   1988).  On  the  front  page  of  the  Herald  Sun  the  day  after  Justice  Bromberg  handed  down  his   ruling,  Bolt,  echoing  the  former  assimilationist  and  integrationist  policies  discarded  during   the  1970s,  questioned  the  right  individuals  have  to  identify  as  indigenous  Australians,   stating  that  he  ‘cannot  be  the  only  Australian  to  wonder  why  fair  people  with  European   ancestry  insist  they  are  Aboriginal  only’  (Bolt  2011).  In  a  ricochet  of  the  sentiments  of   Ruxton  and  Garland,  this  theme  reverberated  in  the  media  in  the  following  days:     What  determines  who  is  an  Aborigine?  Does  one's  Aboriginal  great-­‐great-­‐ grandparent  qualify  them  to  apply  for  special  entitlements,  particularly  when  they   have  a  job,  a  good  home  and  living  standards  similar  to  mainstream  Australia?  …  I   don't  think  Justice  Bromberg  realised  he  had  opened  a  Pandora's  box  when  he  made   his  recent  findings  …  the  goodwill  that  has  continued  since  the  1967  referendum  will   gradually  disappear,  and  that  would  be  a  tragedy  for  all  of  us  but  particularly  for  the   Aboriginal  community  (Cohen  2011).      Under  the  headline,  ‘Why  can’t  I  be  free  to  speak?’  Bolt  declared:   I  believe  we  can  choose  or  even  renounce  our  ethnic  identity,  because  I  have  done   that  myself.  But  I  also  believe  that  many  people  now  increasingly  do  insist  on   asserting  racial  and  ethnic  identities,  and  that  we  increasingly  spend  money  and  pass   laws  to  entrench  them  …  I  wrote  about  people  who,  it  seemed  to  me,  had  other   options  than  to  call  themselves  …  “Aboriginal”  …  They  could  choose  to  identify  as   Aboriginal,  or  as  some  other  ethnicity  in  their  ancestry,  or,  as  I  do,  as  Australian  (Bolt   2011).   What  is  Bolt  saying  here?  That  those  people  who  identify  as  Aborigine,  and  are  therefore,   indigenous  to  Australia  sharing  a  culture  that  can  be  traced  back  60.000  years,  are  not   Australian?  He  appears  to  be  suggesting  that  if  an  Aboriginal  person  in  Australia  today  is  not   living  in  the  ‘outback’,  dispossessed  and  marginalised  then  they  have  not  right  be  call   themselves  an  Aborigine.  Even  worse,  the  implication  is  that  if  your  skin  is  not  dark  enough   then  you  should  not  call  yourself  an  indigenous  person  today.  This  is  dangerous  ground  for  a   modern  public  intellectual  to  take;  it  skates  very  close  to  a  discredited  eugenics  view  of  race   and  ethnicity.  But  Bolt’s  purpose  is  not  to  open  up  debate,  but  rather  to  drive  a  racial  wedge   into  Australian  public  life.     Each  of  the  people  singled  out  by  Bolt,  besides  identifying  as  Aboriginal,  are  recognised  in   their  respective  fields  for  their  achievement  and  excellence.    As  Langton  observed,  this  ‘is   also  Bolt's  gripe.  His  columns  twisted  their  achievement  into  something  sinister  and   underhanded’  (Langton  2011).  Bolt,  having  constructed  an  image  of  indigenous  Australians   as  not  ‘fair-­‐skinned,’  creates  further  doubt  about  the  complainants’  aboriginality  by  avowing   that  it  is  a  choice  they  have  made.  This  ‘signalling  [of]  journalistic  doubt  and  distance’  is  a   device  employed  to  rebound  an  accusation  of  racism  back  onto  the  victim  (Van  Dijk  1993:   186).  Bolt’s  plea  to  identify  allegiance  to  ‘white  group  solidarity’  coupled  with  strategies  of   denial  of  racism,  van  Dijk  asserts,  have  a  socio-­‐political  function,  delegitimising  the  need  for   measures  to  combat  racist  attitudes.  Van  Dijk  states  that  denials  ‘challenge  the  very   8     legitimacy  of  anti-­‐racist  analysis  …  as  long  as  a  problem  is  being  denied  in  the  first  place,  the   critics  are  ridiculed,  marginalised  or  delegitimated’  (Van  Dijk  1993:  181).     The  definition  of  Aboriginality  in  Australia  has  a  legacy  of  a  hard-­‐fought,  often  contentious   struggle  for  recognition  that  reveals  its  grounding  in  historic  colonial  racism.  From  the  1830s   to  the  1950s,  aboriginality  was  defined  according  to  ‘Blood-­‐quotum’  classification;  from  the   1960s  to  the  1970s,  definitions  of  race  came  into  play,  and  by  the  1980s  what  came  to  be   known  as  the  ‘Three-­‐part  Definition’  was  adopted  which  defined  an  Aboriginal  as:   …  a  Person  who:  (a)  is  a  member  of  the  Aboriginal  race  of  Australia,  (b)  identifies  as   an  Aboriginal,  and  (c)  is  accepted  by  the  Aboriginal  community  as  an  Aboriginal   (Gardiner-­‐Garden  2003:  4).   In  a  landmark  paper,  ‘The  legal  classification  of  race  in  Australia’  published  in  1986,  John   McCorquodale  analysed  over  700  pieces  of  legislation  and  identifies  67  ‘classifications,   descriptions  or  definitions’  relating  to  Aboriginality,  wryly  noting  that  there  were  no   equivalent  definitions  of  ‘European’  (McCorquodale  1986:  9-­‐11)  McCorquodale  concluded   that  indigenous  Australians  had  been  ‘singled  out  for  …  an  extraordinarily  diverse  range  of   legislation  …  simply  upon  grounds  of  presumed  racial  superiority’  (McCorquodale  1986:  8).   A  new  species  of  legal  creature  was  created  and  sustained  as  a  separate  class,   subject  to  separate  laws,  separately  administered.  This  form  of  legal  apartheid   preceded  that  of  South  Africa  by  more  than  two  generations  and  continued  on  a   different,  but  parallel  course,  for  another  three  …  The  unequal  provision  and   treatment  of  law  …  mocked  the  notion  of  equality;  when  considered  in  the  absence   of  any  comparable  law  for  “whites”,  or  even  other  “colours”  (McCorquodale  1986:   15-­‐16).     McCorquodale  cites  a  West  Australian  case  Spitz  vs.  Eades,  1971  which,  he  states,  illustrates   ‘the  worst  aspects  of  legislative  racism,  assertions  of  apartheid,  negative  stereotypes,  and   the  equation  of  “white”  with  “civilized,”’  where  the  Court  ruled  that  to  establish   Aboriginality  a  person  had  to  live’  as  ‘an  Aboriginal  native’  requiring  ‘proof  of  a  nomadic  life-­‐ style’:   A  person  could  not  be  held  to  be  living  as  ‘an  aboriginal  native’  when  it  was  shown   by  evidence  that  he  was  living  in  a  house  situated  amongst  those  occupied  by   “white”  citizens  of  Australia,  and  was  generally  in  regular  employment  and  had  been   so  during  the  previous  five  years,  owned  his  own  car,  travelled  to  Perth  three  times  a   year  to  visit  friends  and  relatives,  conducted  himself  acceptable  to  responsible   citizens  of  his  area,  dressed  well,  and  was  able  satisfactorily  to  speak  the  English   language’  (McCorquodale  1986:  17).     In  1966,  South  Australia  introduced  the  first  anti-­‐discrimination  laws.  Tasmania  became  the   last  state  to  enact  anti-­‐discrimination  laws  in  1998.  The  International  Convention  on  the   Elimination  of  all  forms  of  Racial  Discrimination,  ratified  by  the  General  Assembly  of  the   United  Nations  in  1965,  permitted  the  undertaking  of:     Special  measures  taken  for  the  sole  purpose  of  securing  adequate  advancement  of   certain  racial  or  ethnic  groups  or  individuals  requiring  such  protection  as  may  be   9     necessary  in  order  to  ensure  such  groups  or  individuals  equal  enjoyment  or  exercise   of  human  rights  and  fundamental  freedoms  shall  not  be  deemed  racial   discrimination  (United  Nations  1965).   Forty-­‐five  years  later,  indigenous  Australians  still  experience  substantial  discrimination.  In  a   UN  report  released  in  2010,  ‘Situation  of  indigenous  peoples  in  Australia,’  there  are  still   concerns  about  ‘ongoing  effects  of  historical  racism’  in  Australia.  The  report  notes  that   ‘additional  efforts’  are  needed  ‘to  create  a  healthy  environment  conducive  to  the   enjoyment  of  rights  and  freedoms’  for  Indigenous  Australians  (Anaya  2010:  clause  73).     David  O  Sears  and  P  J  Henry  describe  ‘symbolic  racism’  as  a  modern,  less  overt  form  of   racism  where  the  presumption  is  that  ‘Whites  have  become  egalitarian  in  principle  and  …   new  forms  of  prejudice,  embodying  both  negative  feelings  toward  Blacks  as  a  group  and   some  conservative  non-­‐racial  values,  have  become  politically  dominant’  (Sears  &  Henry   2003:  259).  Symbolic  racism  comprises  of  a  political  belief  system  that  encompasses  four   key  principles:  ‘(a)Blacks  no  longer  face  much  prejudice  or  discrimination,  (b)  Blacks  failure   to  progress  results  from  their  unwillingness  to  work  hard  enough,  (c)  Blacks  are  demanding   too  much  too  fast,  and  (d)  Blacks  have  gotten  more  than  they  deserve’  (Sears  &  Henry  2003:   259).  Symbolic  racism  often  manifests  in  a  society,  according  to  Sears  and  Henry,  through   opposition  to  racially  targeted  policy  proposals  (Sears  &  Henry  2003:  259).  It  is  clear  that   Bolt  returns  to  symbolic  racism  in  his  discourse  and  his  attempts  to  portray  the   complainants  as  themselves  racist.  Such  ‘turning  the  tables’  is  a  classic  tactic  of  the  politics   of  racial  discrimination  in  Australia.   Media  Racism:  In  good  faith?   In  a  confusing  op-­‐ed  piece  on  the  ABC’s  blog  site,  The  Drum,  the  host  of  the  Media  Watch   program,  Jonathon  Holmes,  made  comparisons  between  the  Defamation  Act  (2005)  and  the   Racial  Discrimination  Act  (1975)  prompted  by  the  Bromberg  ruling.  Holmes,  proclaiming  that   ‘the  [Racial  Discrimination]  act  sets  a  disturbingly  low  bar,’  described  Justice  Bromberg’s   comment  that  he  was  not  satisfied  that  Bolt  acted  ‘reasonably  and  in  good  faith,’  as   ‘profoundly  disturbing’  for  the  future  of  freedom  of  speech  in  Australia  (Holmes  2011).   Holmes  argued  that  the  Aborigines  named  by  Bolt  in  his  column  could  have  claimed  to  have   been  defamed,  and  that  Bolt,  due  to  his  ‘sloppy’  research  would  not  have  succeeded  with  a   plea  of  truth  and  fair  comment  (Holmes  2011).  However,  Holmes  then  contradicts  himself   and  states  that  Bolt  should  have  been  able  to  succeed  with  a  fair  comment  defence  against   defamation  as  it  is  enough,  in  Holmes  opinion,  ‘that  Bolt  honestly  held  the  views  he   outlined,  and  they  are  based  on  true  facts’  (Holmes  2011).  Holmes  seems  to  be  mounting  a   non-­‐argument  here.  Justice  Bromberg  states  that  Part  IIA  of  the  Racial  Discrimination  Act  is   ‘concerned  to  protect  the  fundamental  right  of  freedom  of  expression’  ((Bromberg  2011:   clause  14).  However,  by  including  ‘errors  of  fact,  distortions  of  the  truth  and  inflammatory   and  provocative  language’  in  his  articles,  Bolt  vetoed  his  right  to  claim  that  what  he  wrote   was  fair  comment  under  the  terms  of  the  Act  (Bromberg  2011:  clause  23).  Why  then,  given   these  errors  and  distortions,  does  Holmes  believe  that  Bolt  would  have  succeeded  with  a   fair  comment  defence  if  Eatock  et  al,  had  sued  Bolt  for  defamation?  And,  as  Justice   Bromberg  wryly  contends:  ‘An  expression  of  identity  is  itself  an  expression  that  freedom  of   expression  serves  to  protect’  (Bromberg  2011:  423).  Fairfax  columnist  David  Marr  is  certain   that  had  the  complainants  decided  to  mount  a  defamation  case,  they  would  have   10     succeeeded.  He  wryly  comments  that  ‘the  Herald  Sun  and  its  star  journalist  should  be   thankful  they're  not  facing  nine  separate  defamation  trials’  (Marr  2011).  It  is  also  worth   noting  that  the  Defamation  Act  and  The  Racial  Discrimination  Act  were  designed  for   different  purposes.  Defamtion  law  concerns  the  protection  of  reputation  from  ill-­‐meaning   imputation.  The  Racial  Discrimination  Act  was  introduced  as  part  of  Australia’s  commitment   at  having  signed  the  International  Convention  of  the  Elimination  of  All  forms  of  Racial   Discrimination.  The  key  provision  of  section  18C,  introduced  in  1995,  does  not  state  that  it  is   unlawful  to  offend  another  person  or  a  group;  it  states  that  it  is  unlawful  if  the  offending  act   is  done  ‘because  of  the  race,  colour  or  national  or  ethnic  origin  of  the  other  person  or  all  of   the  people  in  the  group’.   Quoting  from  the  scriptures…Bolt  wounded  by  friendly  fire   It  wasn’t  just  fellow  Murdoch  hacks  who  came  to  Bolt’s  defence;  former  Howard   government  minister,  David  Kemp  argued  in  The  Australian  that  section  18C  of  the  Racial   Discrimination  Act  is  ‘contrary  to  the  principle  of  freedom  of  speech  that  underpins  our   democracy’.  He  went  on  in  strong  language  to  describe  the  process  by  which  Bolt  was  found   to  have  breached  the  act  ‘obscene  in  the  full  meaning  of  the  words:  offensive,  loathsome,   ill-­‐omened,  disgusting’.  Like  many  conservatives  who  rallied  to  Bolt’s  side,  Kemp  claimed,   without  mounting  much  of  an  argument  that  the  RDA  ‘must  be  abolished  as  soon  as   possible’  (Kemp  2011).   Kemp  quotes  from  philosopher  John  Stuart  Mill’s  famous  1859  essay,  On  Liberty,  to  defend   his  argument:  ‘the  free  expression  of  all  opinions  should  be  permitted,  on  condition  that  the   manner  be  temperate,  and  do  not  pass  the  bounds  of  fair  discussion’  (Kemp  2011).  What   Kemp  omitted  was  that  Mill  also  argued  against  ‘the  tyranny  of  the  majority’  over  the   minority,  asserting  that  it  was:   [A]  social  tyranny  more  formidable  than  many  kinds  of  political  oppression  …  it   leaves  fewer  means  of  escape,  penetrating  much  more  deeply  into  the  details  of  life,   and  enslaving  the  soul  itself  …  there  needs  protection  also  against  the  tyranny  of  the   prevailing  opinion  and  feeling;  against  the  tendency  of  society  to  impose,  by  other   means  than  civil  penalties,  its  own  ideas  and  practices  as  rules  of  conduct  on  those   who  dissent  from  them  (Mill  1989:  8).   Another  former  Howard  Government  minister,  Kevin  Andrews,  now  Member  for  Menzies,   claimed  in  yet  another  op-­‐ed  piece  in  The  Australian,  that  the  Bolt  case  highlighted  ‘the   dangers  that  flow  from  the  assertion  of  group  rights,’  ignoring  the  fact  that  the  case  against   Bolt  was  brought  by  an  individual,  Pat  Eatock  (Andrews  2011).  Summoning  John  Locke’s   1689  Letter  Concerning  Toleration  as  evidence,  Andrews  proposes  that  Locke’s  argument  for   the  separation  of  church  and  state—‘No  person  shall  be  compelled  to  support  any  religious   worship,  but  all  persons  shall  be  free  to  profess  their  religious  opinions’—has  been   extended,  in  an  example  of  the  ‘new  moral  relativism’  to  encompass  ‘cultural  identity  and   multiculturalism’  (Andrews  2011).  However,  Andrews  must  distort  the  case  in  order  to  make   his  point.  ‘  A  claim  is  made  for  example,  that  the  expression  of  a  moral  judgment  about  the   beliefs,  statements  or  actions  of  another  group  should  be  unlawful  because  it  is  offensive  to   members  of  the  group  or  that  it  is  likely  to  insult  that  group’.  Here  racially  motivated   slanders  are  recast  as  an  ‘expression’  of  Bolt’s  ‘moral  judgment’  and  therefore  sould  be   11     above  legal  sanction.  Andrews  also  joins  the  Greek  chorus  clamouring  for  the  RDA  to  be   amended  or  abolished:    Laws  that  enable  groups,  rather  than  individuals,  to  assert  rights  should  be  repealed   before  we  head  further  down  this  dangerous  path  (Andrews  2011).   This  is  an  interesting  restatement  of  classic  bourgeois  individualism,  but  the  irony  is  lost  on   Andrews.  Groups  have  rights  in  contemporary  capitalist  society;  particularly  groups  of   wealthy  and  priviledged  former  Government  ministers  who  claim  a  travel  allowance  and   generous  (self-­‐awarded)  pension  benefits.  However,  the  point  here  is  not  to  poke  easy  fun   at  Kevin  Andrews.  The  point  is  that  Andrews  also  distorts  (by  selective  quoting)  the  meaning   of  Locke’s  message.  Locke  ended  his  Letter  by  declaring  (in  a  passage  omitted  by  Andrews)   that  ‘no  opinions  contrary  to  human  society,  or  to  those  moral  laws  which  are  necessary  to   the  preservation  of  civil  society,  are  to  be  tolerated’  (Locke  2003:  244).  Surely  then,  under   Locke’s  argument,  Section  18C  of  the  Racial  Discrimination  Act  outlawing  racial  vilification  is   an  example  of  a  moral  law  ‘necessary  to  the  preservation  of  civil  society’?   This  point  is  affirmed  by  Justice  Bromberg’s  deliberate  mention  of  the  rhetoric  employed  by   Bolt  in  the  two  original  articles.  Bromberg  pointed  to  Bolt’s  ‘liberal  use  of  sarcasm  and   mockery,’  noting  its  ‘capacity  to  convey  implications  beyond  the  literal  meaning  of  the   words  used’  (Bromberg  2011).  In  the  same  vein,  J.S.  Mill  also  drew  attention  to  the   hegemonic  capacity  of  language:   With  regard  to  what  is  commonly  meant  by  intemperate  discussion,  namely,   invective,  sarcasm,  personality,  and  the  like  …  whatever  mischief  arise  from  their   use,  is  greatest  when  they  are  employed  against  the  comparatively  defenceless  …   the  worst  offence  of  this  kind  which  can  be  committed  by  a  polemic,  is  to  stigmatize   those  who  hold  the  contrary  opinion  …  unmeasured  vituperation  employed  on  the   side  of  the  prevailing  opinion,  really  does  deter  people  from  confessing  contrary   opinions,  and  from  listening  to  those  who  profess  them  (Mill  1989:  35-­‐6).   We  would  argue  that  detering  people  from  ‘confessing  contrary  opinions’  and  ‘listening  to   those  who  profess  them’  was  entirely  Bolt’s  purpose  in  the  offending  columns.  You  either   accept  that  there  is  a  need  in  a  democratic  society  to  protect  citizens  from  racial  vilification   or  you  do  not.     Conclusion:  Who  decide’s  what  is  ‘acceptable  journalism’   These  attempts  to  justify  Bolt’s  words  and  then  to  attack  the  Federal  Court  decision   ultimately  fail  because  of  their  own  internal  insincerity  and  the  self-­‐serving  rhetoric  they   employ.  Justice  Bromberg’s  ruling  is  distorted;  attempts  are  made  to  portray    Bolt  as  the   victim  of  political  correctness  and  the  import  of  his  intemperate  language  is  hosed  down  in   an  attempt  to  make  it  into  some  innocuous  statement  of  personal  ‘moral’  belief.   However,  Bolt’s  carefully  chosen  attack  was  not  innocuous;  by  his  own  admission  he  is  a   culural  warrior  for  Australia’s  conservatives.  He  knew  full  well  that  his  attack  on  ‘pale   skinned’  Aborigines  would  act  as  a  form  of  dog  whistle  politics  to  a  key  section  of  Herald  Sun   readers.  Bolt’s  plaintive  cry  ‘I  am  not  a  racist’,  carries  with  it,  like  so  many  utterances  of  this   phrase  a    very  big  ‘but’.  In  this  case  it’s  ‘I’m  not  a  racist’…but,  these  Aboriginal  people  are   12     taking  things  they  don’t  deserve  (and  so  on).  Bolt’s  columns  were  offensive;  not  just  to   those  named  and  shamed  either.  Many  people  find  his  rhetoric  and  discourse  offensive.   That  is  Bolt’s  ‘schtick’  and  it  is  a  form  of  literary  bullying.   But  what  of  the  so-­‐called  ‘free  speech’  argument:  have  Bolt’s  rights  been  taken  away  from   him?  Michael  Gawenda  added  his  comments  to  the  debate  declaring  that  ‘Bolt’s  offence  …   should  not  have  been  judged  by  a  judge  under  the  Racial  Discrimination  Act.  I  don’t  want   judges  and  lawyers  deciding  what  is  acceptable  journalism  and  what  isn’t’  (Gawenda  2011).     But  this  misses  the  point  on  several  levels.  The  first,  as  we’ve  argued,  is  that  the  RDA  is  a   legislative  public  good  that  is  in  place  to  prevent  forms  of  hate  speech  and  the  incitement  of   racism.  It  is  in  the  broad  public  interest  that  such  laws  exist.  They  are  not  perfect  and   probably  can  never  be  so,  but  they  are  an  important  defence  against  deliberate  and   politically-­‐motivated  racist  attacks  on  minorities.   Secondly,  Bolt’s  columns  can  hardly  qualify  as  ‘journalism’,  except  at  the  broadest  and  most   basic  level;  they  appear  in  a  newspaper  and  in  other  news-­‐like  environments.  There  was   little  or  no  good  research  involved  (which  even  Bolt  admits);  there  were  no  interviews  and   there  is  hardly  a  news  point  to  be  made  in  either  piece.   Finally,  the  Blomberg  ruling  does  not  make  a  point  about  good  or  bad  journalism  or  about   what  is  acceptable  as  journalism.  It  rules  on  the  expression  of  opinion  and  the  court  found   that  the  form  of  the  expression  would  cause  harm.   The  judgement  about  what  is  ‘acceptable  journalism  and  what  isn’t’  is  made  in  the  first   instance  by  Bolt’s  peers  and  secondly  in  the  court  of  public  opinion.   What’s  clear  in  the  Bolt  case  is  that  the  editors  and  lawyers  at  the  Herald  and  Weekly  Times   should  have  made  their  own  judgement  before  publication.  It  is  clear  in  this  case  that  a  poor   decision  was  made.  It  was  made  either  because  Andrew  Bolt  is  such  a  drawcard  that  he  has   celebrity  status  and  no  one  is  game  to  stand  up  to  him  inside  the  Herald  Sun,  or  it  was  made   because  the  senior  editors  on  the  paper  (and  across  News  Limited  generally)  believe  that   they  are  on  a  mission  to  correct  what  they  perceive  as  social  evils.   Either  way,  publication  of  the  columns  has  proved  to  be  a  mistake  but  it  would  be  a  foolish   person  who  put  money  on  the  notion  that  Bolt  or  ‘the  Hun’  have  changed  their  ways.       Allan,  J  2011,  'Race-­‐hate  laws  must  be  repealed  -­‐  THE  THREAT  TO  FREE  SPEECH',  Australian,  The   (Australia),  October  21,  p.  034.     Anaya,  J  2010,  Report  by  the  Special  Rapporteur  on  the  situation  of  human  rights  and  fundamental   freedoms  of  indigenous  people:  Situation  of  indigenous  peoples  in  Australia,  United  Nations.     Andrews,  K  2011,  'VAGUE  LAWS  LET  COURTS  DICTATE  PUBLIC  MORALITY',  Australian,  The   (Australia),  October  21,  p.  014.   13        Bolt,  A  2009a,  'It's  so  hip  to  be  black',  Herald  Sun  (Melbourne,  Australia),  April  21,  2009,  p.  022.     Bolt,  A  2009b,  'White  fellas  in  the  black',  Herald  Sun  (Melbourne,  Australia),  August  21,  2009,  p.  038.     Bolt,  A  2011,  'THIS  IS  A  SAD  DAY  FOR  FREE  SPEECH',  Herald  Sun  (Melbourne,  Australia),  September   29,  p.  001.     Bromberg,  JM  2011,  Eatock  v.  Bolt,  Federal  Court  of  Australia,  Melbourne,  Australia,  28  september   2011.     Cohen,  B  2011,  'DOES  IT  ALL  BOIL  DOWN  TO  A  QUESTION  OF  COLOUR?',  Australian,  The  (Australia),   p.  012.     Devine,  M  2011,  Bolt  case  has  ominous  echo,  September  30,  2011,  News  Limited,  1038-­‐3433.     ,  'Free  Speech  is  vital  to  society'  2011,  Herald  Sun  (Melbourne,  Australia),  September  29,  2011,  p.   036.     IaR  Services  2003,  Defining  Aboriginality  in  Australia,  by  Gardiner-­‐Garden,  J,  Department  of  the   Parliamentary  Library.     Gawenda,  M  2011,  Bolt's  columns  did  not  deserve  to  see  the  light  of  day.  End  of  story.,  30.09.2011,   Australian  Broadcasting  Commission,  30  september,  2011.     Hall,  S  1981,  'The  Whites  of  their  Eyes',  in  GB  Bridges,  Ros  (ed.),  Silver  Linings:  Strategies  for  the   Eighties,  Lawrence  &  Wishart,  London.     Hartigan,  J  2011,  The  courts  and  the  media  in  the  digital  era,  February  12,  2011,  News  Limited,  Gold   Coast.     Holmes,  J  2011,  Bolt,  Bromberg  and  a  profoundly  disturbing  judgment,  30.09.2011,  Australian   Broadcasting  Commission,  September  30,  2011.     Jakubowicz,  A  2011,  Andrew  Bolt,  racism  and  the  internet,  September  29.     Kelly,  P  2011,  'ABBOTT  SHOULD  SEIZE  FREE  SPEECH  AS  ELECTION  ISSUE',  Australian,  The  (Australia),   October  12,  p.  016.     Kemp,  D  2011,  'VILE  LAW  SHOULD  BE  ABOLISHED',  Australian,  The  (Australia),  p.  016.   14        Langton,  M  2011,  'The  gripes  of  wrath',  Sunday  Age,  The  (Melbourne,  Australia),  October  10,  p.  19.     Locke,  J  2003,  Two  Treatises  of  Government  and  a  Letter  Concerning  Toleration,  ed.  I  Shapiro,  Yale   University  Press,  New  Haven,  CT,  retrieved  25/10/2011,   <http://site.ebrary.com/lib/deakin/docDetail.action?docID=10170809%3E.     Marr,  D  2011,  In  black  and  white,  Andrew  Bolt  trifled  with  the  facts,  smh.com.au,  retrieved  5   November  2011,  <http://www.smh.com.au/opinion/politics/in-­‐black-­‐and-­‐white-­‐andrew-­‐bolt-­‐trifled-­‐ with-­‐the-­‐facts-­‐20110928-­‐1kxba.html%3E.     McCorquodale,  J  1986,  'The  Legal  Classification  of  Race  in  Australia',  Aboriginal  History,  vol.  10,  pp.   7-­‐24.     Merritt,  C  2011,  'A  biased  principle  threatens  the  nation',  Australian,  The  (Australia),  September  29,   2011,  p.  002.     Mill,  JS  1989,  On  Liberty  and  other  writings,  cambridge  University  Press,  Cambridge.     Nations,  U  1965,  International  Convention  on  the  Elimination  of  All  Forms  of  Racial  Discrimination,   accessed  25/10/11,  <http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/cerd.htm  ©  OHCHR  1996-­‐2007>.     O'Neill,  B  2011,  'SILENCE  OF  THE  ILLIBERAL  LAMBS',  Australian,  The  (Australia),  p.  014.     Sears,  DO  &  Henry,  PJ  2003,  'The  origins  of  symbolic  racism',  Journal  of  Personality  and  Social   Psychology,  vol.  85,  no.  2,  pp.  259-­‐75.     Slee,  J  1988,  'Definitions  of  an  Aboriginal',  The  Sydney  Morning  Herald.     Stratton,  J  1989,  'Deconstructing  the  Territory',  Cultural  Studies,  vol.  3,  no.  1,  pp.  40-­‐59.     Toohey,  P  2011,  'Conroy's  media  inquiry  aligns  us  more  to  Fiji  than  true  democracy',  Herald  Sun   (Melbourne,  Australia),  p.  036.     Van  Dijk,  T  1993,  'Denying  Racism:  Elite  Discourse  and  Racism',  in  JW  Solomos,  J  (ed.),  Racism  and   Migration  in  Western  Europe,  Berg,  Oxford,  pp.  179-­‐93.     Van  Dijk,  T  1995,  'Elite  discourse  and  the  reproduction  of  racism',  in  RKS  Slayden,  D  (ed.),  Hate   Speech,  Sage,  Newbury  Park,  pp.  1-­‐27.     15     ,  'Wisdom  resides  in  the  votes  of  all  people'  2011,  Weekend  Australian  (Australia),  October  1,  p.  023.         16